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I. Introduction
These days, you may be hard-pressed to find an American who thinks
smoking is healthy or that tobacco companies are trustworthy stewards of 
the public health.1  However, it is still an easy matter to find Americans who 
* Henry Steinberg is a third-year law student at University of California Hastings
College of the Law who has focused much of his studies on topics of environmental 
law and international human rights. He would like to thank his family, the editors of 
the West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, and Professor David Takacs for 
the infinite support that made this note possible. 
1. Smoking and Health Issues, Philipp Morris USA, http://www.philipmorrisusa.
com/en/cms/Products/Cigarettes/Health_Issues/default.aspx (last visited March 24, 
2011) (Phillip Morris USA admits on their website that the company “agrees with the 
overwhelming medical and scientific consensus that cigarette smoking causes lung 
cancer, heart disease, emphysema and other serious diseases in smokers. Smokers 
are far more likely to develop serious diseases, like lung cancer, than nonsmokers. 
There is no safe cigarette.”). 
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don’t believe the energy industry is largely responsible for climate change 
that may seriously threaten our way of life.2  Why the disparity?  
The past few decades have brought about an “extraordinary change” in 
the public’s perception of tobacco companies.3  Today it is a common belief 
that cigarettes are harmful and the American consumers were deceived. 
Cigarette companies no longer even bother to deny the myriad of health 
detriments attributable to smoking.4  Highly successful products liability and 
civil conspiracy lawsuits against these companies are evidence of this 
change in the social perception and legal responsibility of these 
defendants.5   
 While it is difficult to know if the successful tobacco litigation of the 
last two decades was a symptom of changing public perception and access 
to information, or if the successful suits were in fact instrumental in shifting 
public perception, there may likely be a mutually reinforcing cycle between 
litigation and public perception of the related issue. 
Currently in the Ninth Circuit, in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp, an Alaskan village is following the civil conspiracy tobacco litigation 
strategy.6  The villagers allege that oil, coal, and power companies unlawfully 
conspired to deny climate change, sharing and acting upon a common 
purpose to deceive American consumers about the effects of their business 
operations on climate change.7  The plaintiffs claim that the conspiracy 
resulted in state common law nuisance damages by melting arctic sea ice 
and eroding their shoreline.8  If climate change litigation follows a similar 
path as tobacco litigation, these conspiracy allegations may be proven in a 
court of law or confirmed in the public eye through large settlements.   
2. Pew Research Center Publications. Few Americans See Solid Evidence of Global
Warming, Pew Research Center (Oct. 22, 2009) http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1386/cap-
and-trade-global-warming-opinion.   
3. Richard A. Daynard, Media Backgrounder and Commentary, Los Angeles Jury Rejects
New Philip Morris Defense and Issues $28 Billion Punitive Damages Verdict Against Tobacco 
Giant, Tobacco Products Liability Project (Oct. 4, 2002), http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/ 
litigation/cases/Backgrounders/bullock2.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).  
4. Smoking and Health Issues, Philipp Morris USA http://www.philipmorrisusa.
com/en/cms/Products/Cigarettes/Health_Issues/default.aspx (last visited March 24, 
2011). 
5. Daynard, supra note 3.
6. Complaint for Damages at 65-6, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,  N.D.
Cal. (4:08-cv-01138-SBA), Feb. 26, 2008.  See also Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 
855 (5th Cir. 2009) at 859-69 (a putative class action tort claim, including civil 
conspiracy, against oil companies and energy companies).   
7. Complaint for Damages, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,  N.D. Cal.
(4:08-cv-01138-SBA). 
8. Id.
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Legal or social recognition that the climate change debate is fueled 
through civil conspiracy by the largest U.S. emitters of greenhouse gases 
could enormously affect the social, political, and legal realities in the U.S. 
around the causes and proper responses to climate change.  Although 
Washington would still be influenced by pressure from oil, coal, and power 
companies, if the debate about the causes of climate change were to be 
viewed somewhat analogously to the debate about the health effects of 
tobacco, the political feasibility of increased regulation of greenhouse gases 
would increase.9 
Indeed, if plaintiffs overcome the procedural hurdles to climate change 
nuisance suits in state courts, including standing, the political question 
doctrine, and the issue of preemption,10 and are then able to prove that 
greenhouse gas emissions are a public or private nuisance, we may see 
Congressional action around climate change policy, statutory protection of 
these companies from these state common law nuisance claims, or both.11 
Assuming these hurdles can be overcome, if state common law civil 
conspiracy claims around climate change are eventually heard in a 
courtroom, there may be a factual and legal basis to find oil, coal, and power 
companies liable for illegally conspiring against the American public.  While 
successful civil conspiracy and nuisance claims for the emission of 
greenhouse gas are very unlikely to be a silver-bullet for Republican 
Congressional action on climate change, confirmation of allegations of civil 
conspiracy by the energy industry could create a dramatic shift in the public 
perception of the climate change debate, thereby making climate change 
regulation more politically feasible for Congress.  Furthermore, civil 
conspiracy findings could further relieve plaintiffs injured by the effects of 
9. The idea of using climate change nuisance claims to pressure political
action is already a few years old.  Political motivations to force action on climate 
change were likely motivating factors to the eight states that brought a common law 
nuisance claim against American Electric Power Company and other utilities for 
emitting carbon dioxide during the Bush Administration. Ann Carlson, U.S. Supreme 
Court to Hear Climate Change Nuisance Case, LEGAL PLANET, Dec. 6, 2010, 
http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2010/12/06/u-s-supreme-court-to-hear-climatechan 
ge-nuisance-case.  See Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) 
cert. granted, 10-174, 2010 WL 4922905 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010). Decided 131 S.Ct. 2527 
(2011), negative treatment. 
10. The Supreme Court reviewed the issues of standing and preemption in a
climate change nuisance suit this past term in Am. Elec. Power Co. v. AEC, 131 S.Ct. 
2527 (2011).  This decision expressly left open the possibility of state common law 
causes of action in climate change nuisance suits, id. at 2540, discussed further in 
section IV(A) infra. 
11. Eric. A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A
Critical Appraisal at 3 (Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 148, 2007) 
(arguing that if American industries were liable for common law nuisance damages 
related to climate change, Congress would modify tort law to protect these industries 
from “such a profound global disadvantage.”). 
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global warming if a court believes it can properly apportion damages in a 
way suitable to bring relief.   
This note compares the success of civil conspiracy claims against the 
tobacco industry with current civil conspiracy claims against oil, coal, and 
gas companies (“the energy industry”) for their alleged deception around 
global climate change.  The first section outlines general state common law 
elements of civil conspiracy and explores the advantages of this cause of 
action to plaintiffs.  The note then describes the role of civil conspiracy in 
tobacco litigation, largely based on the allegations made in the complaint in 
California v. Philip Morris Inc. (3rd Party Rec. Cal. Super. Ct. 1997 Settled),12 a 
case which helped lead to a multi-state settlement for over $350 billion.13  
The following section examines civil conspiracy in the climate change 
context, beginning with a brief explanation of the difficulties of bringing a 
climate change nuisance claim sufficient to support a civil conspiracy claim, 
followed by an exploration of the civil conspiracy allegations stated in the 
complaint of Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil.14  An analysis of the legal 
basis for these conspiracy claims concludes this section.  Finally, the note 
concludes with a comparative analysis of the utility of state civil conspiracy 
claims in the climate change context with the past use of similar claims in 
tobacco litigation. 
II. Unpacking Civil Conspiracy: Legal Elements and
Plaintiffs’ Attraction
A. Common Law Elements Of Civil Conspiracy
To best compare the history and future of civil conspiracy claims in 
climate change and tobacco litigation, understanding the legal 
fundamentals of a civil conspiracy claim is essential.  Although the elements 
of civil conspiracies are a production of state common law, the various state 
doctrines are substantially similar that for the purposes of this paper it will 
suffice to refer to a general common law civil conspiracy.15  
A civil conspiracy is defined as a “combination of two or more persons 
who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful 
12. First Amended Complaint at 7-11, Cal. v. Philip Morris, Inc., (No.
97AS03031). 
13. Kelder and Davidson, eds., Multistate Master Settlement Agreement and the Future
of State and Local Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Selected Topics and Provisions of the Multistate 
Master Settlement Agreement of Nov. 23, 1998, Tobacco Control Resource Center, Inc., 
Northeastern Univ. School of Law (March 24, 1999),  http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/ 
tobacco_control/resources/msa/ (last visited Sept 29, 2011).  
14. Complaint for Damages, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,  N.D. Cal.
(4:08-cv-01138-SBA).  
15. See, e.g., 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy §50-57 (LexisNexis 2010).
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objective for the purpose of harming another which results in damage.”16  
Thus, a civil conspiracy must include:  
(1) some object or purpose to be accomplished;
(2) a meeting of minds on course of action or object;
(2) one or more overt acts;
(3) and damages as a proximate result thereof.17
Climate change suits will tend to be against corporate defendants, and 
corporations are persons for the purpose of civil conspiracy claims.18  
However, since a corporation is considered one legal “person,” a corporation 
cannot conspire with itself or among its employees, board members, etc.19 
Furthermore, while it is not necessary that each participant know the 
exact details of the plan,20 the conspiring parties must reach “a unity of 
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds 
in an unlawful arrangement.”21  However, there is no requirement for an 
express agreement.22  Rather, the agreement may be implied based upon 
course of conduct.23  It is also worth noting that while some states require 
malice by one or both parties, most states, including California, have no 
malice requirement whatsoever.24  
The element of an overt act may be met by any “unlawful, overt, or 
tortious act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.”25  Civil conspiracy 
does not represent a separate tort; it must be supported by another state or 
federal claim that causes damage to the plaintiff.26  The essential element of 
a civil conspiracy claim is not the formation of an unlawful agreement, but 
rather the damage that results from the unlawful overt acts in furtherance of 
the agreement.27  For example, if two oil companies agreed to mislead the 
public about the effects of carbon emissions in the atmosphere, there is no 
16. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(quotation omitted). See also 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy §50 (LexisNexis 2010). 
17. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 51 (LexisNexis 2010) (citing to both federal
and state cases). 
18. Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 2004).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856.
22. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 51.(LexisNexis 2010).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 16. Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 52 (West 2011), Balt. Football Club, Inc. v. Super.
Ct., 171 Cal. App. 3d 352, 359 (1985). 
26. 16. Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 53 (West 2011).
27. Okun v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. 3d 442, 454 (1981).  See also 16. Am. Jur. 2d
Conspiracy § 53 (West 2011). 
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civil conspiracy unless such emissions are deemed to be tortious in their 
own right.  For this reason a plaintiff must be able to successfully plead a 
state or federal claim to support the civil conspiracy claim.28 
Proximate causation is also an element of conspiracy, requiring that 
the overt acts pursuant to the agreement were the proximate cause of 
damage to the plaintiff.29  However, some courts seem to not place much 
emphasis on this requirement, and instead focus on whether the defendants 
conspired to continue the nuisance and whether this nuisance caused 
damage. 
B. Benefits of Civil Conspiracy Claims for Plaintiffs
In recent years, the rise in civil conspiracy claims in mass tort litigation 
is likely due in part to the various advantages the plaintiff bar perceives in 
pleading a civil conspiracy claim.30  These advantages include the possibility 
of high punitive damage awards accompanying civil conspiracy findings,31 
the receptivity of jurors to the idea of industries conspiring against the 
public,32 the rise in trade organization and industry groups,33 litigation 
strategy to overcome summary judgment and increase settlement value,34 
28. 16. Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 53 (West 2011).
29. In re Welding Fume Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 2d 775, 802 (N.D. Ohio
2007).  
30. James D. Pagliaro, Brian W. Shaffer, and Joseph Duffy, The Alarming Rise in
the Use of Civil Conspiracy Theories in Mass Tort Litigation, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. 
Available at http://www.emccray.com/.../471_1_._CONSPIRACY._The_Alarming_Rise_in 
_the_Use_of_Civil_Conspiracy_Theories_in_Mass_Tort_Litigation.pdf. (Another 
perspective, one unsurprisingly not adopted by the defense attorneys cited above, 
views the recent rise in civil conspiracy claims as a product of concerted industrial 
malfeasance as opposed to a strategically minded plaintiff bar.  Both theories may 
be true, but since here we are exploring the benefits to a plaintiff in pleading a civil 
conspiracy claim, the legal realism view of our cited defense counsel suffices.)    
31. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of
Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 979, 983-84 (2001) (discussing the prevalence of punitive damages in 
civil conspiracy tobacco litigation). 
32. Pagliaro, supra note 31, at 1-2.
33. Id.
34. Arvin Maskin, Litigating Claims for Punitive Damages: The View from the Front Line,
31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 489 (1998) (discussing the strategic bargaining power plaintiffs 
enjoy when punitive damages are a possibility); John S. Gray, Partner in Envtl. Law, 
Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, Address at the UC Hastings College of the Law West-
Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy Symposium: A Public Nuisance: 
Tort Law’s Response to Global Warming (Feb. 28, 2011) (discussing how civil 
conspiracy claims can create unresolved issues of fact to overcome a summary 
judgment motion).   
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and, for politically motivated climate change plaintiffs, the possibility of 
changing public perception. 
One obvious advantage of civil conspiracy claims over other nuisance 
claims is the likelihood of high punitive damages.  The major tobacco cases 
highlight this point.  In those cases, conspiracy of concealment, 
misrepresentation, and nondisclosure by the tobacco industry committed in 
the pursuit of fraud for profit resulted in tremendous punitive damage 
awards.35  When punitive damages are a real possibility, plaintiffs possess 
heightened bargaining power in settlement negotiations leading up to a jury 
verdict.36  
In addition, aside from a juror’s likely natural aversion to the idea of an 
industry intentionally or knowingly defrauding the American public for 
profit, jurors may be predisposed to claims of civil conspiracy as a result of 
media influence and the prevalence of “conspiracy theories” in general.37  
Furthermore, because jurors are also consumers and employees outside the 
courtroom, they may be inclined towards conspiracy theories when plaintiff 
attorneys explain that such claims legally spread the liability throughout the 
industry in question.38 If jurors feel a connection to plaintiffs based on 
consumption or employment patterns, this may increase their motivation to 
hold a greater portion of the industry liable. 
The prevalence of trade organizations, industry groups, and public 
relations groups further aids plaintiffs making such claims.39  Since 
circumstantial evidence is enough to show common intent40 and the 
agreement may be implied rather than express,41 the existence of forums 
such as trade organizations, seminars, research groups and coalitions make 
it difficult for a member of a given industry to assert ignorance regarding the 
allegedly unlawful conduct of other members of that industry.42  As 
discussed below, the energy industry has extensive involvement in industry 
35. Cabraser, supra note 32, at 983-984 (See infra pp. 12-13 for further details of
damage awards involving civil conspiracy claims). 
36. Maskin, supra note 34.
37. Pagliaro, supra note 31, at 3 (discussing the influence of shows such as
“The Insider” and “A Civil Action” on potential jurors).  
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Revert v. Hesse, 184 Cal. 295, 302-3 (1920).
41. Lee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 249 F.R.D. 662, 669 (D. Colo. 2008)
(holding that express agreements are not necessary for civil conspiracy) and O’Neil v. 
Daimlerchrysler Corp., 538 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2008) (discussing the permissibility 
of implied agreements for civil conspiracy). 
42. Pagliaro, supra note 32, at 3.
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front groups, and the conspiracy claims can easily focus on the activities of 
these groups.43   
Also, a civil conspiracy can rest on either a statutory violation or a 
common law violation.44  Therefore, whether there is a statutory violation, 
such as an unfair competition statute as was the case in the tobacco cases, 
or if plaintiffs make common law tort claims, as is the case in climate 
change litigation, civil conspiracy claims are still an option.  
A civil conspiracy claim in a lawsuit may also improve a plaintiff’s 
litigation strategy.45  In addition to the heightened bargaining position 
outlined above,46 a properly plead civil conspiracy claim may help a plaintiff 
overcome a motion for summary judgment.  Summary judgment is available 
when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”47  If a complaint 
properly pleads civil conspiracy allegations, it can be difficult for a court to 
grant a defendant’s summary judgment before allowing at least limited 
discovery.48  Based on this theory, if plaintiffs believe discovery will afford a 
“smoking gun document” that proves a conspiracy, the inclusion of a civil 
conspiracy claim in a nuisance suit may limit the possibility of losing at 
summary judgment to procedural issues such as standing and the political 
question doctrine.Finally, civil conspiracy claims may play a role in shifting 
public perception of a public debate.  Consider, for example, how the debate 
about the causes and effects of climate change would evolve if a judicial 
decision stated that those on one side of the debate were breaking the law 
through the distribution of misinformation.  Considering the political or 
ideological motivation of some climate change cases, certain plaintiff 
groups may be interested in finding cases that can exploit the potential to 
shape public opinion around an idea.49 
Despite the numerous strategic and politically attractive aspects to 
pleading a civil conspiracy, the vagueness of the legal elements required 
may be pitfalls for plaintiffs.50  For example, the causation element of civil 
conspiracy claims is an example of an often unclear area that could be 
difficult for plaintiffs, depending on what level of causation courts require. 
Although in many circumstances, plaintiffs may plead civil conspiracy simply 
43. First Amended Complaint at 7-11, Cal. v. Philip Morris, Inc., (No. 97AS03031)
and Complaint for Damages at 65-6, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,  N.D. Cal. 
(4:08-cv-01138-SBA, Feb. 26, 2008). 
44. 16. Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 53 (West 2011)
45. Maskin, supra note 34; Gray, supra note 36.
46. Maskin, supra note 34.
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
48. Gray, supra note 35 (suggesting that this strategy was a motivating factor
for the plaintiff attorneys in Kivalina). 
49. Carlson, supra note 9.
50. PAGLIARO ET AL., supra note 31, at 3.
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because the alleged facts suggest such a claim will be successful, a 
consideration of the benefits of civil conspiracy claims allows a more 
thorough understanding of what is at stake for plaintiffs.  
III. The Role Of Civil Conspiracy In Tobacco Litigation
A. The Success of Tobacco Litigation and Civil Conspiracy
Although successful civil conspiracy claims and large damage awards 
and settlements dominate contemporary tobacco litigation, this was not 
always the case.51  For many years, the tobacco industry successfully 
defended on the basis of lack of causation, assumption of risk, or lack of 
awareness.52  
The tobacco industry also successfully claimed preemption under the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”).53  However, in 
1992, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Supreme Court widened the door 
for plaintiffs, holding that, although the FCLAA preempts state court claims 
based on failure to warn, federal law does not preempt state law claims 
based on theories of express warranty, intentional fraud and 
misrepresentation, and, most importantly, civil conspiracy.54 
Discovery documents obtained in Cipollone and incriminating 
confidential industry documents sent anonymously to a San Diego law 
professor complemented the decision that federal law does not preempt 
certain state common law claims such as civil conspiracy.55  These 
documents provided evidence of “the tobacco industry’s calculated and 
successful efforts [since] the 1930s to confuse the American public and their 
doctors about the dangers of cigarette smoking.”56 
Not surprisingly, tobacco claims after Cipollone centered on the nearly 
fifty-year-old conspiracy among tobacco manufacturers and their public 
51. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play’s Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and
Consumer Choice in “Third Wave” Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 469-70 (1998) 
(describing the first “wave” and second “wave” of unsuccessful tobacco litigation from 
1954-1973 and from 1983-1992).  
52. Id at 481; see also Angela Lipanovich, Smoke Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against
the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation Is Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
429 (2005). 
53. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of
Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 979, 991-92 (2001) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 148 (2000)). 
54. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524-30 (1992).
55. Lipanovich, supra note 53, at *6.
56. Id. (citing Supplement to Press Release, Incriminating Cigarette Documents Released,
TOBACCO PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROJECT, (March 26, 1988) (on file with author), (from R.J. 
Reynolds archives, Published Document 19880326). 
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relations groups to conceal and misrepresent the science behind the health 
risks of smoking.57  Following this, the tobacco industry began losing 
lawsuits.58  After refusing to settle any claim for decades, the industry began 
settling with individuals, class actions, and third parties in derivative suits 
brought by governmental agencies and healthcare providers on the basis of 
fraud and civil conspiracy claims.59   
Although most of the tobacco suits followed a similar format, two are 
particularly noteworthy examples of successful civil conspiracy claims. 
These cases are California v. Philip Morris, Inc.60 and Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.61 
Shortly after Cipollone, tobacco litigation reached a new frontier when 
the Attorney General for California filed California v. Philip Morris, Inc.62  
California joined this third-party health-care recovery suit with thirty-nine 
other attorneys general from other states.63   
California alleged that, since 1953, the tobacco companies conspired 
and agreed to unreasonably restrain the market for cigarettes in violation of 
the Cartwright Act by limiting and suppressing research and information 
that could have led to product innovations.64  This claim, along with the 
claims made in other states, led to the November 23, 1998, Multistate 
Master Settlement Agreement, whereby the tobacco industry agreed to pay 
$368.5 billion over twenty-five years for state medical costs of tobacco 
related illness as well agreements to discontinue certain outdoor advertising 
and take other measures to limit youth access to cigarettes.65  Through this 
settlement, every defendant implicitly acknowledged potential liability.  This 
case was a turning point in public opinion regarding the illegality of the 
tobacco industry’s actions.66 
In Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., smokers and survivors brought a class 
action lawsuit against RJ Reynolds and other tobacco companies and 
industry organizations.67  The jury awarded approximately $12.7 million in 
57. Cabraser, supra note 54, at 991.
58. Id. at 991, 1017; Lipanovich, supra note 56, at 3 (citing Robert L. Rabin, A
Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 878 (1992)). 
59. Id.
60. 3rd Party Rec. CA Superior Ct. 1997 Settled.
61. 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
62. 3rd Party Rec. CA Superior Ct. 1997 Settled.
63. Lipanovich, supra note 56, at 3.
64. First Amended Complaint at 17, Cal. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 (No.
97AS03031).  
65. KELDER & DAVIDSON EDS., supra note 13.
66. Lipanovich, supra note 56, at 43.
67. 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
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compensatory damages and $145 billion in punitive damages.68  Although 
the Florida Supreme Court later held that the award of punitive damages 
was excessive69 and decertified the class,70 the court upheld the findings of 
general liability against defendants, including liability for civil conspiracy-
misrepresentation and civil conspiracy-concealment.71  After Engle, it was 
clear to the tobacco industry that punitive damages could reach the limits of 
due process.72   
B. Civil Conspiracy Allegations in California v. Philipp Morris
Engle and California v. Philip Morris both relied on claims that the tobacco 
industry engaged in fraud and conspiracy to mislead the public about the 
health effects of tobacco.73  Whether individual smokers, state-classes, state 
attorneys general, or the United States government filed the cases, all the 
tobacco litigation since Cipollone has had similar conspiracy claims.74  Thus, 
the “core of basic, operative facts” is the same in Engle, California v. Philip 
Morris, or prospective tobacco litigation.75  To gain a better understanding of 
the history of conspiracy in the tobacco industry, this section will explain 
the specific allegations of conspiracy in California v. Philipp Morris.  This is 
essential for the following analysis, examining the differences and 
similarities between conspiracy claims in tobacco and climate change 
litigation.76   
The State of California claimed that since the 1950s the tobacco 
industry knew of the health risks of tobacco and repeatedly made deceptive 
representations of safety and medical endorsements.77  Tobacco companies 
were aware of the importance of health and safety related claims to 
consumers since the 1940s.78  After two significant studies established a 
68. Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 6, 2000). 
69. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1265.
70. Id. at 1266.
71. Richard A. Daynard et al., Despite Headlines, Florida’s Supreme Court’s Decision in
Engle Case Will Prove to be an Enormous Blow to Cigarette Companies, TOBACCO PRODUCTS
LIABILITY PROJECT (July 6, 2006), http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/litigation/cases/ 
pressreleases/ENGLEVFLSUPCT2006.htm.  
72. Cabraser, supra note 54, at 1017.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. To gain a more detailed understanding of the allegations listed in the
California complaint, see NAOMI ORESKES & ERIC M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL
WARMING, at 136-168 (Bloomsbury Press 2010). 
77. First Amended Complaint at 8. Cal. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 (No. 97AS03031).
78. Id. at 8.
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causal link between exposure to tobacco products and cancer, the tobacco 
companies met in 1953 and formed an industry front group, the Tobacco 
Industry Research Committee (“TIRC”), to spread disinformation among the 
public and to suppress information from health officials that could have led 
to increased regulation or reduced sales of tobacco.79  California argued that 
the acts of the tobacco companies and industry groups constituted a 
conspiracy to restrain and manipulate health information about tobacco and 
to stabilize the market for tobacco products.80   
California’s complaint argued that both TIRC and its successor group, 
Council for Tobacco Research (“CTR”) applied a coordinated, industry-wide 
strategy to mislead and confuse the public about the dangers of tobacco by 
challenging or suppressing any negative information on tobacco.81  It was 
alleged that the conspirators created a campaign of disinformation by 
suppressing research showing negative health effects of tobacco and by 
misrepresenting the information it did not suppress, all while purporting to 
provide unbiased information to consumers and regulators.82  It was argued 
that the companies mislead the public about the addictive qualities of 
nicotine, agreed not to conduct individual research on the health effects of 
smoking tobacco, and suppressed the research and development of a safer 
cigarette.83  California stated that Philipp Morris even attacked its own 
scientists, firing its researchers for beginning the development of a safer 
cigarette as well as threatening them with legal action if they published 
unfavorable reports.84   
California asserted that advertisements claiming that the tobacco 
industry was committed to protecting the public health and to disclosing 
unbiased research were fundamental steps in the conspiracy to suppress 
information that could lead to a reduction in sales of tobacco.85  In 1958, the 
companies formed the Tobacco Institute, to exchange information, police 
agreements, and coordinate activities between the companies.86  It was 
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 9.
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 9, 11.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id. at 9-10. See also Union of Concerned Scientists, Smoke, Mirrors, and Hot
Air: How ExxonMobil Uses Big Tobacco’s Tactics to Manufacture Uncertainty on Climate Science, 
at 6. (2007). http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/global_ 
warming_contrarians/exxonmobil-report-smoke.html (quoting “A Frank Statement to 
Cigarette Smokers” from the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, published in 1954, 
claiming: “We will never produce and market a product shown to be the cause of any 
serious human ailment.”). 
86. First Amended Complaint at 8. Cal. v. Philip Morris, Inc.,  (No. 97AS03031), at
10.
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argued that TIRC, CTR, and the Tobacco Institute knowingly distributed false 
advertisements claiming that tobacco companies were committed to 
promoting progress of independent scientific research in the field of tobacco 
and health.87  These industry groups also disseminated articles and 
publications that were meant to have the same effect.88  
In California, the underlying claim for the conspiracy was a statutory 
cause of action that the tobacco companies conspired to unreasonably 
restrain the market for tobacco in violation of the Cartwright Act (Business 
and Professions Code section 16720 et seq.), by limiting, suppressing, and 
misrepresenting research and health effects of tobacco.89  In climate change 
litigation, the underlying claim for conspiracy is nuisance.90   
IV. The Role Of Civil Conspiracy In Climate Change
Litigation
A. The Underlying Nuisance Claim In Climate Change Tort
Cases
Nuisance is a proper underlying tort to support a claim of civil 
conspiracy.91  Two recent cases, Kivalina92 and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,93 use 
nuisance claims to support allegations of civil conspiracy.  It is necessary to 
explain the common law climate change nuisance claims upon which civil 
conspiracy allegations rest in order to realistically discuss the feasibility of 
these civil conspiracy claims.  A complete discussion of the difficulties of 
using nuisance claims in the climate change topic is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but a cursory examination of the dynamic state of climate change 
nuisance law will allow a broader understanding of the potential for climate 
change civil conspiracy claims.  Before unpacking the feasibility of nuisance 
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 16.
90. See Section IV.A infra.
91. See, e.g., Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1284 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
(plaintiffs “have sufficiently stated causes of actions for the claims underlying the 
conspiracy claims, to wit, trespass, nuisance, and fraudulent concealment”); Chappell 
v. SCA Servs., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (“the allegations of this
complaint sufficiently allege an actionable conspiracy, since creation of a nuisance is
itself an actionable wrong”); see also In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52
F.R.D. 398, 404 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (automakers’ conduct at issue in antitrust case by
States “is in effect a conspiracy to maintain a public nuisance–smog”).
92. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal.
2009).  
93. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) at 859-69.  reh’g en banc
granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010) Appeal dismissed. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 
F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
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in the climate change context however, it is worthwhile to pause and 
consider why plaintiffs are bringing common law nuisance claims to climate 
change in the first place.  
In the last few years plaintiffs are increasingly attempting to use 
common law nuisance to hold the energy industry liable for damages that 
will occur or have occurred as a result of climate change.94  The diverse 
reasons for this trend include a theoretical appropriateness of tort law, the 
creation of political pressure, and plaintiffs’ immediate needs for 
compensation for harm allegedly related to climate change.95  
Judge Guido Calabresi explains that the dual aims of tort law are to 
reduce of the cost of accidents and to provide corrective justice.96  Plaintiffs 
harmed by climate change are prime candidates for corrective justice if the 
harms alleged (such as rising seas, coastal erosion, or more frequent and 
powerful storms) would not have occurred but for climate change.97  
Furthermore, society may be burdened by high accident costs of climate 
change due to the unequal distribution of the costs of climate change, the 
high transaction costs of organizing potential victims before damage occurs, 
and the lack of public knowledge about climate change.98  In light of these 
factors, attaining reductions in the accident cost of climate change through 
litigation may be particularly necessary to find the optimal balance for 
society as a whole.99  
Indeed, some suggest that tort law is “a private law subject with a 
public vision,”100 and that U.S. courts are already significant drivers of 
climate change policy.101  Although it may seem doubtful that there are any 
effective drivers of climate change policy in Washington, judicial pressure 
94. Kevin A. Gaynor, et al., Challenges Plaintiffs Face in Litigating Federal Common law
Claims. 40 ENVT’L L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 108454, 10845 (2010). 
95. See infra pp 19-21.
96. Eduardo M. Penalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the
Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 570-71 (citing GUIDIO CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 24-31 (1970) (discussing the 
reduction of accident costs and justice as the two main goals of tort law). 
97. Penalver, supra note 96, at 574,75; see also, David A. Grossman. Warming Up to
a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation. 28 COLUMB. J. ENVTL L 1, 3-5 
(2003).  
98. David A. Grossman. Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation. 28 COLUMB. J. ENVTL L 1, 3-5 (2003). 
99. Id. at 4. (An irony to note is that the factors that make litigation useful to
obtain a socially optimal accident cost of climate change may also act as 
impediments to climate change nuisance litigation.  Impediments to climate change 
nuisance litigation in general are discussed below.).   
100. Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega Social
Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 511 (2001). 
101. David Markell & J. B. Ruhl, An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigation in
the United States, 40 ENVT’L L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10644, 10644 (2010). 
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could, in theory, affect energy policy.  The recent Supreme Court case, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, is one example of judicial decisions driving executive 
action.102  Thus, despite the seeming intractability of Congress regarding 
climate change legislation, it is likely that political goals drive some climate 
change nuisance suits. 
Tobacco litigation stands as an example of the social and public policy 
roles of tort law, representing the largest reallocation of damages in US 
history.103  Climate change threatens to cause more damage than cigarettes 
ever could, and from this perspective, nuisance law may seem appropriate to 
reallocate damages and prompt a paradigmatic policy shift in Washington. 
Nuisance law, like civil conspiracy claims, may also shift public 
opinion, which can also be useful for regulatory efforts.  This approach 
worked with tobacco litigation, where government methods for discouraging 
smoking became more effective once public perception began to shift after 
the major tobacco settlements.104  Plaintiffs in the 1990s followed the 
tobacco litigation strategy and filed lawsuits against the fast-food industry 
regarding obesity, hoping to at least create public support or pressure the 
industry to change its ways.105  It seems reasonable that plaintiffs in climate 
change litigation might be similarly attracted to this strategy.  Indeed, to the 
extent that the court system is viewed as a legitimate forum to air 
reasonable complaints, the very presence of a nuisance claim for damages 
from climate change quell the debate as to the causes and outcomes of 
climate change and could cause media and society to take climate change 
more seriously. 
Finally, aside from potential political motivations for using tort law to 
address climate change, there are enormous practical reasons as well. 
Some plaintiffs are already facing hundred million dollar damages from loss 
of sea ice and erosion of shorelines106 or destruction of their homes through 
increased storms such as hurricane Katrina.107  In the absence of any other 
methods for relief, plaintiffs perceive tort law as a potential method to seek 
due compensation for losses suffered. 
However, other commentators argue that using nuisance for climate 
change suits would be too rife with causation, standing, and justiciability 
102. Mass. v. EPA, 549 US 497 (2007).  Although this case involved agency
inaction rather than a common law claim, it is still a prime example of a judicial 
decision forcing energy policy measures.   
103. See Id. at 512.
104. Forrest Lee Andrews, Small Bites: Obesity Lawsuits Prepare to Take on the Fast
Food Industry, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 177 (2004). 
105. Id.
106. Complaint for Damages, supra note 6, at 45-6.
107. Comer v. Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).
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issues to be useful.108  Many of these issues are either currently under review 
in United States courts or were recently addressed.  A brief examination of 
three relevant cases shows that some courts are receptive to granting 
plaintiffs’ standing to plead state common law nuisance claims and that 
courts are choosing to hear climate change nuisance suits rather than 
dismissing them for procedural or substantive grounds.  
The most important case by far in the world of climate change 
nuisance suits is the recent Supreme Court decision in AEC v. Connecticut.109  
In Connecticut, eight state attorney’s generals sued six electric power 
corporations claiming that greenhouse gas emissions caused by the 
defendants constituted a public nuisance.110  In its holding this past June, 
the Supreme Court, after finding that the Clean Air Act preempts federal 
common law climate change nuisance claims, expressly left open the 
possibility of state common law nuisance actions and remedies.111  The 
parties in that case had neither briefed preemption nor otherwise addressed 
the availability of a claim under state nuisance law, and thus the Court left 
the matter open for consideration on remand.112  The Court explained that 
state common law causes of action would be subject to a thorough 
demonstration of congressional intent before the preemption issue can be 
determined: “In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal 
common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on 
the preemptive effect of the federal Act.”113  Thus, as civil conspiracy is a 
state common law claim, Connecticut leaves open the possibility of plaintiffs 
bringing a state common law based civil conspiracy claim. 
In Comer v. Murphy Oil, the court allowed private plaintiffs to move 
forward with a climate change torts claim.114  The court held that the 
landowners satisfied Article III and prudential standing requirements to 
bring private nuisance, trespass and negligence claims against oil and 
energy companies, alleging these companies caused emission of 
greenhouse gasses that contributed to global warming and added to the 
force of Hurricane Katrina which destroyed their property.115  The appellate 
108. Posner, supra note 11, at 3; see also Richard O. Faulk & J. Gray, A Political
Question, 28 THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, no. 2, 2011 at 30-33 (arguing that climate 
change public nuisance cases present a nonjusticiable question).  
109. 131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011).
110. 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) cert. granted, 10-174, 2010 WL 4922905 (U.S.
Dec. 6, 2010). 
111. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. at 2540.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859-69 (5th Cir. 2009) reh’g en banc
granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010) appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
115. Id.
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court also held that these claims did not present non-justiciable political 
questions.116  This was the first time a federal appellate court allowed private 
plaintiffs to move forward with a climate change torts claim.117  
Comer also involved a civil conspiracy claim against the utility 
companies for disseminating misinformation about the dangers of climate 
change and greenhouse gas emissions.  The court held that plaintiffs did not 
have Article III standing to bring this civil conspiracy claim because the 
plaintiff landowners failed to identify a particularized injury and that the 
claims were generalized grievances common to all citizens or litigants in 
United States.118   
However, this outcome isn’t as conclusive as it may seem.  After an 
initial appeal, the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc.119  But by the time a 
late recusal caused the Fifth Circuit to be unable to rehear the case, the 
court had already dismissed the prior Fifth Circuit decision, leaving neither 
case law nor precedent in the area, and stopping the Comer case in its 
tracks.120   
In contrast to the rulings in the Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit 
above, in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., the Northern District of 
California court held that common law nuisance claims for greenhouse gas 
emissions do, in fact, present non-justiciable political questions.121  
Furthermore, the District court found that plaintiffs also lacked Article III 
standing.122  These decisions are currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. 
While this looks like a striking blow to common law nuisance claims, 
this may be a sign of nothing more than judicial efficiency on the part of a 
district court judge.123  Justiciability and standing are questions of law that 
appellate courts are better suited to hear, and it might seem like a waste of 
judicial resources to a district court judge to manage discovery, motions to 
compel, depositions, summary judgment motions and perhaps even a trial, 
116. Id. at 869
117. Melissa Maleske. Comer v. Murphy Oil Leaves the Future of Climate Change
Litigation Uncertain, Inside Counsel (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.insidecounsel.com/ 
Issues/2010/August-2010/Pages/Comer-v-Murphy-Oil-Leaves-the-Future-of-Climate-C 
hange-Litigation-Uncertain.aspx?page=1  
118. Comer, 585 F.3d at 867-8.
119. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d at 208.
120. Maleske, supra note 115; Although there are differences in state standing
doctrine, the Supreme Court in AEP v. Connecticut will likely guide plaintiffs on the 
standing issues left unclear by the strange outcome of Comer. 
121. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D.
Cal. 2009). 
122. Id.
123. Jonathan Zasloff, The Kivalina Climate Change Lawsuit: Wrong is Right, LEGAL
PLANET (Oct. 19, 2009), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2009/10/19/the-kivalina-
climate-change-lawsuit-wrong-is-right/.  
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all the while running the risk that the district judge might be told on appeal 
that the case should not have been heard for procedural reasons.124  A 
similar situation occurred in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, where the lower courts 
spent seven years on the case before the Supreme Court heard it and ruled 
that the Clean Water Act displaced the common law upon which the original 
claim was made.125  In this sense one might view the district court’s decision 
in Native Village of Kivalina similar to an interlocutory appeal.126  Indeed, the 
defendants in that case have moved to stay the appeal until the Supreme 
Court rules in Connecticut,127 which suggests that the district court judge was 
simply biding her time.  However, Native Village of Kivalina’s civil conspiracy 
claims were based on state law.  The District court found that it did not have 
jurisdiction to address state claims after dismissing the federal claims, and 
thus it dismissed the civil conspiracy claims without prejudice.128 
Lower courts have moved in different directions regarding the ability of 
plaintiffs to bring common law climate change nuisance claims.  Connecticut 
and Comer both suggest that state common law claims could move forward. 
Thus, provided that the underlying climate change nuisance suits are 
brought on state common law grounds and not federal common law, it is 
reasonable to continue our analysis of civil conspiracy claims on the 
assumption that underlying climate change nuisance suits are feasible. 
B. Civil Conspiracy Allegations In Kivalina.
Although both Native Village of Kivalina and Comer involved conspiracy 
claims, our analysis will focus on Native Village of Kivalina since the federal 
elements of the case are still pending and since the state-law civil 
conspiracy claims have yet to be addressed by any court.  The allegations of 
conspiracy below are taken from the Complaint for Damages in the Native 
Village of Kivalina case.129  The complaint lists fifty-nine paragraphs of 
allegations, spanning over fifteen pages.130  This section will highlight only 
the most relevant aspects.131 
The Native Village of Kivalina complaint alleges that ExxonMobil, AEP, BP 
America Inc., Chevron Corporation, ConocoPhillips Company, Duke Energy, 
124. Id.
125. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, (1981).
126. Zasloff, supra note 122.
127. Kyle Danish, et al., Weekly Climate Change Policy Update, VanNess
Feldman (Jan. 31, 2011) http://www.vnf.com/news-alerts-553.html  
128. Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
129. Complaint for Damages at 47-62, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
N.D. Cal. (4:08-cv-01138-SBA, Feb. 26, 2008).
130. Id. at 47.
131. To gain a more detailed understanding of allegations similar to those
listed in the Native Vill. of Kivalina complaint, see ORESKES, supra note 77 at 169-215. 
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Peabody, and Southern (“Conspiracy Defendants”) undertook a campaign to 
mislead the public about the science of global warming by originally 
denying its existence and then later falsely claiming that either 1) there is 
too much scientific uncertainty to act, or 2) that global warming can be good 
for the planet.132  ExxonMobil allegedly led the industry efforts to 
disseminate misinformation about global warming.133  The complaint states 
that to achieve their goals of misleading the public to avoid regulation, the 
industries formed and used public relations groups, front groups, and fake 
citizen and scientific organizations such as the Greening Earth Society,134 the 
George C. Marshall Institute, and the Global Climate Coalition (“GCC”).135 
Some of the front groups are actually the same bodies that were used 
in the tobacco conspiracies.  For example, The Advancement of Sound 
Science Coalition (“TASSC”) was formed in 1993 through funding from 
Philipp Morris to discredit the mainstream science establishing health 
hazards of second hand tobacco smoke.136  TASSC funded a web site, 
JunkScience.com, where it coined the Orwellian terms “junk science” to refer 
to mainstream, peer-reviewed science adverse to industry interest, and 
labeled industry-sponsored science as “sound science.”137  At some point in 
the 1990s, TASCC began working for the energy industries, ExxonMobil 
funded TASSC, and the energy industry adopted these terms to subvert the 
global warming debate.138 
The GCC, founded in 1989 by forty-six corporations and trade 
associations, provides another example of alleged concerted industry action 
to spread misinformation about climate change in order to continue 
emitting greenhouse gasses unabated.139  In the 1990s the GCC allegedly 
raised tens of millions of dollars from its members, including the conspiracy 
defendants, to distort the public debate around global warming with the 
intention to enable its members to contribute to a public nuisance through 
the continued emission of greenhouse gases.140  The GCC met in the offices 
of many of the Conspiracy Defendants and as part of its work it distributed a 
132. Complaint for Damages at 47, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
N.D. Cal. (4:08-cv-01138-SBA, Feb. 26, 2008)
133. Id. at 9.
134. The Greening Earth Society was formed on Earth Day in 1998 by the
Western Fuels Association to advocate the rising levels of CO2 is beneficial for the 
environment. Id. at 55. 
135. Id. at 47.
136. Id. at 48.
137. Complaint for Damages at 48, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
N.D. Cal. (4:08-cv-01138-SBA, Feb. 26, 2008)
138. Id.
139. Id. at 49.
140. Id.
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video to hundreds of journalists falsely claiming that increased levels of 
carbon dioxide will increase crop production and help feed the hungry 
people of the world.141 According to the complaint, internal documents 
written by the GCC show that the GCC and its members knew that such 
claims were false.142 
Likewise, the George C. Marshall Institute, allegedly, with ExxonMobil 
funding, played a central role in the Conspiracy Defendants’ disinformation 
campaign, acting as a clearinghouse for global warming contrarians and 
releasing a report falsely claiming that peer-reviewed studies indicated 
temperature increases were consistent with “natural climate change.”143  The 
George C. Marshall Institute, along with the GCC and the American 
Petroleum Institute, even attacked credible and preeminent expert 
scientists, namely Dr. Santer, the lead author of a crucial chapter of the 1995 
Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”).144  The leader of the attack was Dr. Frederick Seitz, a man 
who was not present at any of the IPCC meetings to which he referred in his 
attack.145  Interestingly enough, Dr. Frederick Seitz previously worked for R. J. 
Reynolds in the tobacco industry and he would frequently correspond with 
R. J. Reynolds’ legal counsel in order to help produce authorities for the 
tobacco industry to rely upon in lawsuits.146 
During the 1990s, certain Conspiracy Defendants such as ExxonMobil, 
Chevron Corporation, The Southern Company and trade associations such 
as the American Petroleum Institute (which represented all U.S. oil company 
defendants), formed part of the Global Science Communication Team 
(“GSCT”).147  Directly emulating the tobacco industry’s disinformation 
campaign, the GSCT allegedly outlined an explicit strategy to invest millions 
of dollars to create uncertainty regarding the issue of global warming.148  
The conspiracy claims directed at ExxonMobil in particular are that 
ExxonMobil “engaged in a multi-faceted attack on global warming which 
included exploiting science, denying the consensus on global warming, 
running misleading advertising denying the existence of global warming or 
its causes, and funding organizations who attacked global warming on these 
141. Id. at 50.
142. Complaint for Damages at 51, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
N.D. Cal. (4:08-cv-01138-SBA, Feb. 26, 2008).
143. Id. at 53.
144. Id. at 54.
145. Id.
146. ORESKES, supra note 77, at 29-30.
147. Complaint for Damages at 55, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
N.D. Cal. (4:08-cv-01138-SBA, Feb. 26, 2008).
148. Id.
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bases and/or the factors causing global warming.”149  The complaint cites a 
Union of Concerned Scientist publication, “Smoke, Mirrors, and Hot Air” 
claiming that from 1998 to 2005 ExxonMobil directed $16 million to forty-
two organizations promoting misinformation on global warming.150   
C. Legal Analysis of Kivalina’s Civil Conspiracy Claims
The Kivalina complaint detailed the factual averments in support of the 
elements of conspiracy.151  A conspiracy claim can be brought only when 
there is a valid underlying federal or state claim.152  Here, there are federal 
public nuisance claims and state public and private nuisance claims.153  A 
conspiracy claim can’t survive when the supporting nuisance claim is 
dismissed.154  Although defendants argue that none of the elements of a 
nuisance claim are met,155 the availability of nuisance claims are beyond the 
scope of this paper.  This analysis will assume that plaintiffs can meet the 
procedural and substantive elements of a nuisance claim against the named 
defendants. 
The Native Village and City of Kivalina claims that the defendants had 
a common plan or course of conduct to spread misinformation and increase 
doubt about the science of global warming.156  This, in turn, seems to have 
allowed the defendants to continue their tortious pollution unabated, 
knowing full well the injurious effects of their emissions.157  The use of front 
groups and industry groups to spread misinformation also make it easier for 
the tribe to show that the defendants encouraged and assisted each other’s 
injurious conduct.158   
One interesting argument that could be raised on appeal is whether 
the First Amendment Free Speech clause, which protects public debate in 
matters of public discourse including science, should bar the tribe’s 
149. Id. at 56-57.
150. Id.; and Union of Concerned Scientists, Smoke, Mirrors, and Hot Air: How
ExxonMobil Uses Big Tobacco’s Tactics to Manufacture Uncertainty on Climate Science, Jan. 2007, 
at 10. http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/global_warming_ 
contrarians/exxonmobil-report-smoke.html.  
151. Compl., for Damages, at 47-62, 65-6. (¶¶ 189-248, 268-77).
152. See, e.g., Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F3d at 856-57.
153. Compl., for Damages, at 62, 64.
154. See, e.g., Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir.
1989); 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 340 (2001). 
155. Br. of Def.’s-Appellees American Electric Power Compl., Inc. et al.,  at 50-3.
Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. (No. 09-17490). See also Appellants Reply Br., 
at 39-42. Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. (No. 09-17490) 
156. Compl. for Damages, at 47.
157. Id.
158. Compl.for Damages at 48, 51-2.
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conspiracy claim.159  However, free speech protection does not extend to 
deliberatively false or reckless statements,160 and it is likely that a jury could 
find that the conspiracy defendants were making deliberatively false 
statements or were reckless as to the truth of their statements.  For example, 
if the internal GCC documents show, as the complaint alleges, that the GCC 
knew its statements regarding the supposed benefits of increased carbon 
dioxide were misleading, this seems to preclude the possibility of free 
speech protection.161 
Another argument regards the causation element of conspiracy.  The 
defendants argue that the tribe’s conspiracy claim rests upon the 
“impermissible speculation that, absent the alleged publicity campaign, 
either the political branches would have effected unspecified regulation or 
consumers would have engaged in an unprecedented boycott of the fossil 
fuel industry.”162  This is an interesting way to frame the issue, but it is not 
necessarily legally appropriate.163  A conspiracy must result in damages, but 
the damages may derive from the causal chain of the underlying nuisance, 
not from the conspiracy itself.164  Here, the tribe claims that the defendants 
engaged in a conspiracy intended to enable them to continue their 
nuisance, and it is the nuisance that caused the harm to the tribe.  Not all 
courts hold that it is necessary that the conspiracy cause the harm, rather, 
the conspiracy can simply be an agreement to accomplish the harm that 
occurs.165   
Certain cases in other circuits seem to require proximate causation 
between the conspiracy and the damages arising from the harm.166  However, 
since this case will be heard in the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
doesn’t specify whether damage must be proximately caused by the 
conspiracy or from only the underlying unlawful action.167  It seems 
reasonable for a court to conclude that if parties agree to perform an illegal 
act, and their act causes damage, their agreement should be an unlawful 
159. Br. of Def.’s-Appellees American Electric Power Comp., Inc. et al., at 55 (citing
Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
160. Appellants Reply Br., at 46. Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. (No.
09-17490), (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
161. See Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326 (S.D.N.Y.
2006). 
162. Br. of Def.’s-Appellees American Electric Power Comp., Inc. et al., at 54.
163. See supra pp. 7-8.
164. See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(holding that civil conspiracy is a “combination of two or more persons who, by some 
concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of 
harming another which results in damage”). 
165. Id.
166. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy §51 (LexisNexis 2010).
167. Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856.
 West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012 
179 
conspiracy regardless of if the agreement proximately caused the act.  If the 
court agrees with this reasoning, as Gilbrook suggests, it is likely that the 
plaintiffs could win on this point as well.   
While there are elements over which to argue regarding conspiracy, 
such as whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine shields defendants’ conduct168 
and whether the heightened FRCP 9(b) pleading requirements were met, the 
heart of the matter in terms of legal debate is clearly over whether there is a 
valid underlying nuisance claim.   
If the nuisance were to be found, what is the relevance of conspiracy 
claims, and might the presence of these claims actually help lead to a 
similar outcome as the tobacco litigation, or are the differences too 
profound?  
V. Civil Conspiracy in Tobacco and Climate Change
Compared
Comparing the allegations in the tobacco and the climate change 
cases above, it appears that the energy industry and the tobacco industry 
both engaged similar campaigns to create uncertainty and doubt about the 
risks associated with their products.  Both industries systematically created 
and maintained doubt about their products to prevent industry regulation 
and continue product support.169   
The plaintiffs’ lawyers in Kivalina and Comer are not the only ones who 
have noticed the similarities between the strategies of the tobacco and 
energy industries.  The Union of Concerned Scientists, a science-based 
nonprofit organization working for a “healthy environment and a safer 
world”170 released a report in 2007 outlining the resemblance between big 
tobacco’s strategy to deceive the American public and ExxonMobil’s 
approach to climate change.171  This report claims that both the tobacco and 
energy industries “manufactured uncertainty” by raising doubts about 
168. It does not.  The Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not extend the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment beyond petitioning the government, (Cardtoons, L.C. 
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 2000).  Kivalina
plaintiffs make no claims that the Conspiracy Defendants petitioned the government.
169. In fact, this theory is mentioned in the Br. of Def.’s-Appellees American
Electric Power Comp., Inc. et al., at 54.  While the Defendants confuse causation 
requirements regarding civil conspiracy claims (discussed in the proceeding section 
of this paper) their comment of the possible motivation behind such activities by the 
energy industry is telling, since it is the same motivation that drove tobacco.   
170. Union of Concerned Scientist, About Us,  http://www.ucsusa.org/about/
(2010). 
171. Union of Concerned Scientists, Smoke, Mirrors, and Hot Air: How ExxonMobil
Uses Big Tobacco’s Tactics to Manufacture Uncertainty on Climate Science, Jan. 2007, at 10. 
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/global_warming_contra
rians/exxonmobil-report-smoke.html. 
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adverse scientific evidence, adopted a strategy of “information laundering” 
through seemingly independent front groups, promoted scientific 
spokespeople who misrepresented science and cherry-picked facts, and 
shifted the focus from meaningful action claiming the need for “sound 
science.”172   
The complaints above support these conclusions.  In fact, some of the 
very front groups and individuals that were creating doubt for tobacco were 
the same groups that manufactured doubt for the energy industry.  One 
example is TASCC, which was employed by both the energy and tobacco 
industries to refute mainstream science, labeling it “junk science.”173  
Another example is Dr. Seitz, who developed expert witnesses for the 
tobacco industry174 and later attacked an established IPCC scientist for the 
energy industry.175 
Indeed, the tobacco groups TIRC and CTR functioned nearly identically 
to groups like the GCC and the George C. Marshall Institute for the energy 
industries.176 Furthermore, both industries have established research 
institutions while also funding ideological and advocacy organizations to 
carry out disinformation campaigns.177  These seemingly inconsistent 
activities allow the industries to tout a pro-scientific, unbiased position, 
while simultaneously undercutting the established science in the area.178  
Both the tobacco and energy industries have directed attacks at 
scientists as well.  For example, the California complaint outlines how Philipp 
Morris fired and threatened to sue its own researchers after they reported 
unfavorable findings.179 Likewise, the energy industry undertook an 
unprecedented attack on a lead author of an IPCC chapter report.180 
Considering that these industries capitalized on creating doubt and 
sought to avoid regulation,181 doing such activities make sense, so long as 
the industry was not caught.  For example, as one tobacco industry memo 
stated: “Doubt is our product, since it is the best means of competing with 
the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the minds of the general public.  It is also the 
172. Id. at 1.
173. Compl. for Damages, at 48, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,  N.D.
Cal. (4:08-cv-01138-SBA, Feb. 26, 2008). 
174. ORESKES, supra, note 77, at 29-30.
175. Complaint for Damages at 51, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
N.D. Cal. (4:08-cv-01138-SBA, Feb. 26, 2008)
176. Id. at 47-56; See First Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at 8-11.
177. Smoke, Mirrors, & Hot Air, supra note 86, at 1-2.
178. Id. at 7.
179. First Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at 11.
180. Complaint for Damages, supra note 4, at 54.
181. Id.; E.g., Oreskes, supra note 67.
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means of establishing a controversy.”182  Indeed, the energy industry has 
made similar comments about their strategy of manufactured doubt.183  
However, is promoting doubt or undermining peer-review science in 
order to continue selling a product illegal?  The history of tobacco litigation 
points to an affirmative answer, provided that there is an underlying illegal 
act behind the industry misinformation.  In the case of tobacco, the 
underlying illegal acts claimed were product defects or unfair competition.184  
In climate change, the underlying act must be nuisance.  If the court does 
not require proximate causation for the conspiracy, then any false 
information or false doubt produced in order to continue the emission of 
greenhouse gasses could be a civil conspiracy. 
More importantly, if both the underlying nuisance and conspiracy 
claims are found to be true, what will be the outcome?  Are plaintiffs likely 
to see punitive damage awards that stretch the limits of due process, such 
as the $145 billion award in Engle,185 or would juries and Congress react more 
sympathetically to the energy industry? 
One important difference to consider is the type of products to which 
these cases refer.  When juries considered the lies told by tobacco 
companies, it might have been relevant that the products sold by the 
defendants served little purpose except to create profits for their industry, 
while harming the health of society.  In the context of climate change 
litigation, should juries ever hear arguments on civil conspiracy claims, 
defense attorneys would certainly point out that their industry is not selling 
a luxury product such as cigarettes, but rather an indispensible product for 
society: energy.186  In contrasting the conspiracy claims against the tobacco 
industry, it is possible juries would be more lenient to the energy industry 
were the issue successfully framed as an earnest attempt to keep energy 
affordable for America’s working families.  On the other hand, the harm from 
climate change could potentially be so great that juries may not accept this 
“lesser of two evils” method of framing the alleged conspiracy.  Rather, it is 
possible that juries could be persuaded that civil conspiracy claims in the 
climate change context are far more egregious than those in tobacco 
litigation since the energy industry allegedly abused the public’s trust about 
a product society cannot do without, in stark contrast to misrepresentations 
182. Smoke, Mirrors, & Hot Air, supra note 86, at 7 (citing Brown & Williamson,
(Nov. 23, 1998), Smoking and Health Proposal, available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/ 
landman/332506.html. 
183. Oreskes, supra note 77.
184. Supra Section III: The Role of Civil Conspiracy in Tobacco Litigation.
185. Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22, (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
186. Although the extent to which fossil fuel energy is essential to society is
debatable, it is unlikely that any plaintiff could convince a jury that fossil fuel use is a 
societal luxury item such as cigarettes.  
 West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012 
182 
made about a luxury item consumers can choose whether or not to 
purchase.  
Another big difference between tobacco litigation and climate change 
litigation is the apportionment of damages.  In climate change cases, joint 
and several liability may not be appropriate, since the plaintiffs could be 
viewed as at fault.187  This is because nearly all plaintiffs have used the 
energy industry’s products, which means they have also contributed to 
global warming, and any damages received are likely to be apportioned.188  
Here the contrast between climate change and tobacco cases is telling.  
In California v. Philip Morris, the California attorney general was joined by 
thirty-nine other states, all seeking compensation for their Medicare 
expenses.189  Had these cases gone to a jury trial, it would have been difficult 
for defense attorneys to convince jurors that the state of California had 
“unclean hands,” or that California was at fault for the incurrence of 
Medicare expenses related to its residents tobacco-related illnesses.   
However, in climate change litigation, whether the suits are filed by 
private plaintiffs or by the states, plaintiffs will nearly always be responsible 
for some of the energy use that leads to global warming — the nuisance 
forming the basis of the complaint.190  This argument is particularly valid if 
the plaintiff is a large state, such as California.  There, the state’s energy use 
is the cause-in-fact of the greenhouse gas emissions that the state would be 
attempting to limit through its lawsuit.191 
In Kivalina, the Inuit plaintiffs — despite being considered by some to 
be “ideal” climate plaintiffs for their low carbon lifestyle192 — still potentially 
use too much carbon dioxide to be eligible for joint and several liability.193  If 
damages are apportioned, then even ideal plaintiffs might have to sue a 
huge number of defendants to receive even a minimal recovery.194 
187. Gaynor, supra note 94Common law, at 10-12.
188. Id.
189. Kelder and Davidson, eds., supra note 13, at 4; First Amended Complaint,
supra note 12. 
190. Gaynor, supra note 94, at 10-12.
191. Id. at 10-11. It is important to note that this comparison of the
apportionment of damages is between a case involving states as plaintiffs against 
tobacco companies, rather than individual smokers.  In a case involving a plaintiff 
smoking class, comparative fault and apportionment of damages becomes an issue, 
similar to the situation in a climate change case where the plaintiff class burns fossil 
fuels for their electricity, transportation, and heating needs. 
192. Id. at 11, (citing Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change
Litigation Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701, 724 (2008)). 
193. Id. at 11.
194. Gaynor, supra note 94, at 10.
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However, joint and several liability refers to compensatory damages. 
One of the main attractions of civil conspiracy claims, based on the history 
of tobacco litigation, is the potential for high, punitive damage awards. 
However, these issues may be more intertwined than they seem.  
If juries are exposed to the complexities of causation and 
apportionment, combined with the arguable necessity of fossil fuel use, it is 
possible that jurors, who rely on energy consumption every day, may be less 
inclined to offer large awards. However, perhaps the actions of certain 
defendants, such as ExxonMobil, may be viewed as so egregious as to 
prompt Engle-like punitive awards, despite the relatively low percentage, on 
a global scale, of carbon dioxide emissions that originated from that 
particular defendant. 
Furthermore, if state climate change nuisance suits are allowed to 
move forward, the compensatory damages alone could be enormous, even if 
apportioned, if the damages are assessed in a plaintiff-friendly manner.  For 
example, the relocation of the Village of Kivalina may cost as much as $400 
million.195  If this case is filed in state court and returns an award, there will 
be countless other plaintiffs lining up at the courthouse doors.  
There is another dramatic difference between climate change litigation 
and tobacco litigation.  A unique element of the tobacco litigation was that 
the plaintiff bar, state attorneys general, politicians, and the press made 
powerful, coordinated attacks against the tobacco industry.196  Together, they 
persuaded American society that tobacco use was an issue worthy of 
societal concern.197  Conversely, politicians and the media have not yet 
placed a great deal of importance on climate change.  Indeed, the Executive 
decision to work on the Health Care Reform Bill last term rather than a 
climate bill is indicative of this point.  Thus, perhaps because their 
supporters are so different, the plaintiff bar should not expect a similar show 
of support as they received in the tobacco litigation.  But despite an 
apparent disinterest from the media, politicians, and attorneys general, the 
civil conspiracy claims in Native Village of Kivalina and other future suits, may 
help to create societal awareness that climate change deserves as much 
attention as cigarette smoke, and that the industry misled the public.   
195. Complaint for Damages, supra note 6, at 49.
196. Roger Parloff, Is Fat the Next Tobacco? For Big Food, the Supersizing of America is
Becoming a Big Headache, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 2003, available at http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/02/03/336442/index.htm. 
197. Id. (quoting a tobacco defense attorney distinguishing between tobacco
litigation and fast food litigation following the tobacco strategy). 
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For example, much of the public still believes there is a valid debate 
around climate change.198  A Pew Poll from 2009 shows that only thirty-six 
percent of Americans believe that the earth is warming from anthropogenic 
activities.199  Considering that peer-reviewed scientific research suggests 
precisely the opposite view, this debate is likely fueled by misinformation 
from the conspiracy defendants.  If courts were to declare this debate a farce 
fueled by civil conspiracy, perhaps the Pew Polls would shift in a more 
scientifically supported direction.  Would such a shifting perspective on the 
climate change debate help to bring about action from the states, 
politicians, and media, creating a similar situation as in tobacco litigation? 
Although a realpolitik attitude could easily label this outcome as a 
pipedream, the ecological, social, and legal importance of this paradigm 
shift makes it impossible to discounting.   
It is certainly an attractive idea to some environmental or social 
groups to cast ExxonMobil and Chevron in the same light as Philipp Morris 
and R. J. Reynolds, and perhaps civil conspiracy claims, if they are ever 
heard, might help bring this about.  However, perhaps the most attractive 
and certain aspect of civil conspiracy claims, at least for an advocacy driven 
attorney or organization, could be the societal shift in the debate around the 
causes and effects of climate change.   
VI. Conclusion
Considering the potential risk to tobacco profits from unfavorable
health-related information, it may not be surprising that tobacco interests 
used trade groups to conspire against the health of the American public by 
casting false doubt upon the dangers of cigarettes.  Likewise, it is plausible 
that oil, coal, and power companies would use trade groups similarly to 
conspire against the American public to continue conducting their business 
as usual.  
However, the largest difference between these two stories is not the 
possibility of a conspiracy, but the procedural bars facing the plaintiff class 
in climate change litigation.  Class action attorneys in the tobacco litigation 
had good procedural footing on the grounds of strict liability.  Standing is 
rarely an issue when plaintiffs are dying from cancer,200 and strict liability is 
rarely a political question. 
In the case of climate change conspiracy however, the procedural 
footing upon public nuisance is softer, perhaps similar to the unstable 
198. Pew Research Center Publications, Few Americans See Solid Evidence of Global
Warming, October 22, 2009, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1386/cap-and-trade-global 
warming-opinion.   
199. Id.  
200. The hurdle there may be causation, but not likely standing.
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consistency of melting permafrost in a warming Arctic community. 
Furthermore, there are substantial substantive issues to overcome, such as 
the apportionment of damages and the proximate causation of the civil 
conspiracy.  However, if state courts accept climate change nuisance 
plaintiffs as is currently possible under Connecticut v. AEP201 and these courts 
find the underlying nuisance actionable, it is possible that civil conspiracy 
claims may be successful. 
The outcome in Connecticut v. AEP foreclosed any possibility of federal 
climate change nuisance cases, but it did not, however, foreclose state law 
nuisance-based cause of actions entirely.202  Therefore, the possibility of civil 
conspiracy claims, for the time being, remain untainted and are available 
avenues to pursue.  However, if state courts should similarly refuse to 
recognize climate change nuisance suits, plaintiff lawyers will think of 
tobacco’s conspiracy as the big catch, but climate change as, “the one that 
got away.”   
201. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. at 2540.
202. Id.
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